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rm is extended by
introducing distorted signals of the partiesinvestments. Investment incen-
tives are then given in two ways, by allocating ownership rights and by tying
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disagreement bene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1 Introduction
Most projects of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
have the following in common: They are very risky and require both, very
high and mainly relationship-specic, investments. Therefore, the activi-
ties of NASA seem to nicely t into the property-rights theory of the rm,
which was originated by Grossman & Hart (1986), Hart & Moore (1990)
and Hart (1995) (henceforth, GHM). Indeed, property-rights considerations
seem to play an important role in protecting the investments of NASAs
contractors and, accordingly, in providing investment incentives, as NASA
spends about 90 percent of its annual budget on outsourced work.1 How-
ever, NASA uses other instruments to induce investment incentives as well,
namely performance-based contracts. According to part 37 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), these performance-based contracts have to
be used by NASA, whenever possible.
Notice that, besides the NASA example, there are many other situations,
where asset ownership and performance-based contracts interact in providing
investment incentives. Consider e.g. a salesperson selling products for a
client. The performance of the salesperson usually depends on several e¤orts.
It depends on how intensively he is searching for new potential customers, on
how honestly he presents his clients products to these potential customers,
on how hard he learns to get to know his clients products and so on. These
e¤orts are hardly veriable by a third party. Consequently, an important task
is to align the salespersons interests with those of his client. One possibility
1See report GAO-03-507 by the Government Accountability O¢ ce (GAO).
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is to provide the salesperson with certain ownership rights (i.e. transacting
with a self-employed person instead of transacting with an employee). A
self-employed salesperson might e.g. have higher incentives to get to know
his clients products, as, in case the parties break up, this knowledge might
prove useful in selling related products of other clients. Hence, giving assets
to a salesperson (for example an o¢ ce) might improve the salespersons e¤ort
decision. Yet, providing the salesperson with ownership rights is certainly
not the only way to induce incentives. As there usually exists a contractible
signal of the salespersons performance - namely total sales achieved by this
person - incentives might also be induced by means of pay tied to the signal
realization. Similarly, the client oftentimes exerts some non-veriable e¤orts
(e.g. for marketing the products), too. Incentives might be given by asset
ownership or, for instance, by tying the clients payment to his total monetary
marketing expenses.2
As the examples indicate, an important question is, how incentives pro-
vided via ownership rights interact with incentives provided via payments
based on signal realizations. Introducing contractible investment signals into
a multi-tasking property-rights model, this paper tries to give an answer to
this question.
I start with a benchmark model, where investment signals are not avail-
able. In such a situation, investments are always ine¢ ciently low. Moreover,
they are misallocated to single components, whenever the coe¢ cient vec-
2The salesperson might e.g. be paid a lower xed wage the more his client has spent
for product marketing.
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tors of the realized benet, that is, the benet when the parties agree to
work together, and the disagreement benet are not parallel. In this setting,
providing a party with ownership rights always improves the partys invest-
ment decision, as each component of investment gets closer to the rst-best.
Having considered this benchmark model, investment signals are introduced.
With investment signals, each party is incentivized in two ways, by allocat-
ing ownership rights (which I henceforth label "residual-rights" incentives)
and by tying pay to the signal realization (which I label "contractual" in-
centives). Quite interesting is the optimal strength of contractual incentives.
This strength will be shown to depend on two distortions, the signal dis-
tortions from the realized as well as from the disagreement benet. This is
because an optimal signal is usually distorted from the realized benet, but
undistorted from some linear combination of realized and disagreement ben-
et. Thus, the more the actual signal deviates from this linear combination,
the lower is its weight in an optimal contract. Further, the optimal owner-
ship structure minimizes the sum of the squared Euclidean distances of the
induced investments from their respective rst-best levels. That is, an owner-
ship structure will be optimal, if it leads to investments, which both deviate
relatively little from the respective rst-best investments. The squaring of
the Euclidean distances implies that an extreme deviation of one investment
should be avoided, even if the other investments deviation is very low. It
follows that the party with the more important investment should be induced
to choose a relatively higher investment. Finally, it is found that providing a
party with ownership rights does no longer necessarily improve that partys
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investment decision. Possession of ownership rights might adversely a¤ect
contractual incentive provision and this might yield a worse investment. As
a consequence, the results stated in Harts (1995) famous Proposition 2 are
not robust to an introduction of investment signals.
By introducing contractual incentives into the property-rights theory of
the rm, this paper contributes to the literature on the interaction of asset
ownership with other instruments in generating investment incentives. Two
examples of this literature are Holmström & Milgrom (1994) and Holmström
& Roberts (1998).3 While Holmström & Milgrom show that asset ownership,
contractual incentives and freedom from direct controls are often complemen-
tary, Holmström & Roberts analyze the determinants of di¤erent real-world
"make or buy" decisions and conclude that a comprehensive theory of the
rm must not focus on property-rights considerations alone.
Clearly, this paper is additionally related to the literature on multitask-
ing, which was initiated by Holmström & Milgrom (1991) and further de-
veloped by e.g. Baker (1992, 2002), Feltham & Xie (1994) or Corts (2004).
Assuming that one component of investment is directed at enhancing the
value of an asset, Holmström & Milgrom determine the optimal ownership
structure, too. They nd that integration is more likely in quite uncertain
settings. Under integration, it is optimal to set incentives lower than under
non-integration to promote investment into the assets value. In uncertain
settings, non-integration yields high risk-premiums to be paid and is thus
suboptimal. Besides the completely di¤erent modeling approach, this pa-
3Further examples include Holmström (1999), Baker et al. (2002) and Roider (2004).
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per di¤ers from Holmström & Milgrom in other ways. Most importantly,
investment does not a¤ect an assets value, but is in human capital. As a
consequence, providing a party with ownership rights does not only a¤ect
that partys incentive to invest into the asset, but may change the whole
investment vector. Further, this paper deals with risk-neutral parties so that
risk-considerations are neglected.4
Finally, the paper is also related to the work of Baker & Hubbard (2003,
2004). They analyze the impact of an exogenous change in contractibility of
driver e¤ort on ownership structures in the United States trucking industry.
While their main focus is on an empirical analysis, they theoretically compare
the cases, where one component of driver e¤ort is contractible and where
driver e¤ort is completely non-contractible. It is shown that, in the latter
case, the driver should be more likely to own the truck. The model of Baker
& Hubbard can be understood as a special case of the current model, where
the signal of a drivers investment corresponds to that component of driver
e¤ort being contractible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains
the basic model with multidimensional investments. In Section 3, investment
signals are introduced. Further, the optimal incentive schemes are derived
and implications for the optimal ownership structure are given. A concluding
discussion is o¤ered in Section 4.
4As indicated before, the current model extends the property-rights approach to the
theory of the rm. See, for a discussion emphasizing the commonalities and distinctions
of this approach and the approach by Holmström & Milgrom (1991), Gibbons (2005).
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2 The basic model
2.1 Economic Environment
To highlight the ine¢ ciencies in investment behavior arising with multidi-
mensional investments, I rst present a model, where signaling of investment
is impossible. The model is similar to the one in Hart (1995). There are two
risk-neutral and wealth-unconstrained parties, a downstream (denoted as D)
and an upstream party (denoted as U), and two assets, as1 and as2. U pro-
duces, in combination with as2, a single unit of an input. D, using as1, can
transform this input into a nal product that is sold on the output market.5
We concentrate on the following three ownership-structures: Non-integration
(D owns as1 and U owns as2), forward-integration (U owns both, as1 and
as2), and backward-integration (D owns both, as1 and as2).6 As the parties
are wealth-unconstrained, they settle on the structure yielding the highest
aggregate benet.
Before starting the production process, both parties are given the oppor-
tunity to undertake certain non-contractible investments. Particularly, U is
able to reduce the inputs production costs (e.g. by costly acquiring skills
that allow for a less tedious production), whereas Ds investment might fa-
cilitate sale of the nal product at a given price, or, similarly, allow D to
5Although a supplier-producer relationship is considered, the model can easily be rein-
terpreted to describe the producer-seller relationship from the introduction.
6The case of reversed non-integration is, di¤erent from property-rights models without
signaling of investments, not necessarily suboptimal. It is therefore briey discussed in
Subsection 3.4. This subsection also deals with joint ownership of assets.
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charge a higher price for it. Let i = (i1; :::; in)  0 (e = (e1; :::; em)  0)
represent the level and 0:5
Pn
k=1 (ik)
2 (0:5
Pm
j=1 (ej)
2) the costs of Ds (Us)
investment. Investments are assumed to be multidimensional. For example,
acquiring skills allowing for a less tedious production could be twofold, via
learning from courses or books and via learning by doing at the workplace.
Investments are also assumed to be in human capital, i.e. they do not a¤ect
the assetsvalues.
It is further assumed that the partiesinvestments are (partly) relationship-
specic. In other words, they will entail a higher benet, if the parties agree
to trade the input. Formally, suppose that, in case of trade between the two
parties, Ds revenue is given by R (i) = aT i, with a 2 <n+ and T denoting the
transpose of a vector. His payo¤ then equals R(i) p 0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2, where
p is the agreed price for the input. In the event of disagreement D buys a
non-specic input from the market at price p. Due to the non-specicity of
the input, Ds revenue is lower and given by r(i; A), where A represents the
set of assets D owns. That is, we may either have A = fas1; as2g (backward-
integration), A = fas1g (non-integration), or A = ? (forward-integration).
Moreover, suppose that r(i; as1; as2) = bT i, r(i; as1) = cT i, r(i;?) = dT i,
with b; c; d 2 <n+ and a > b  c  d.7 Ds payo¤ in case of buying the input
7These inequalities do not only ensure that investment is relationship-specic, but that
this relationship-specicity also holds in a marginal sense. The marginal return from
investment will be higher, if the parties agree to trade the input than if they do not.
Further, this marginal return is also higher the more assets the investing party has access
to. Although these assumptions might seem inappropriate in some practical settings, they
should widely hold. Further, they enable a comparison of the results to be derived in
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from the market is r(i; A)  p  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2.
Similarly, if the parties decide to trade, Us production costs will be given
by C(e) =  fT e, with f 2 <m+ , and his payo¤ by p  C(e)  0:5
Pm
j=1 (ej)
2.
If trade does not occur, U will go to the market and sell the input at price p.
However, before selling the input, U has to make some adjustments to turn
the specic input into a general one. Hence, his production costs are higher in
this case. They are given by c(e; B), whereB, the set of asset U owns, is either
fas1; as2g (forward-integration), fas2g (non-integration), or ? (backward-
integration). To be concrete, let c(e; as1; as2) =  gT e, c(e; as2) =  hT e and
c(e;?) =  jT e, where g; h; j 2 <m+ and f > g  h  j. Us payo¤ in case of
disagreement is given by p  c(e;B)  0:5Pmj=1 (ej)2.
To prevent the parties from writing an e¤ective long term contract, as-
sume that there is ex ante uncertainty about what type of input D requires.
The parties therefore cannot specify the input price in advance since they
do not know what type of input D needs. The uncertainty is resolved after
investments are undertaken. Ex post, the parties are thus able to achieve
an e¢ cient bargaining outcome. This outcome is assumed to be the Nash-
bargaining solution with equal bargaining power.8
The timing of the model is as follows. In the rst stage, the parties decide
on the ownership structure, that is, they choose an allocation of the assets.
this paper with the results presented in Hart (1995) and so help to isolate the e¤ects of
introducing an investment signal.
8The assumed bargaining procedure is of great importance. As shown by de Meza
& Lockwood (1998) or Chiu (1998), abstracting from Nash-bargaining may lead to very
di¤erent results.
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In the second stage, investments are undertaken, while, in the third stage,
the parties decide on whether or not to trade, i.e. whether or not to supply
the input.
2.2 Solution to the basic model
Before turning to the model solution, it is convenient to introduce the fol-
lowing denitions: (a) Ds investment will be said to become relatively un-
productive, if R(i) is replaced by R(i) + (1   )0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 and r(i; A)
by r(i; A) + (1  )0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2, where  is a small positive number. Sim-
ilarly, Us investment will be said to become relatively unproductive, if C(e)
is replaced by C(e)   (1   )0:5Pmj=1(ej)2 and c(e;B) by c(e;B)   (1  
)0:5
Pm
j=1(ej)
2. (b) Assets as1 and as2 will be independent, if b = c and
g = h. (c) Assets as1 and as2 will be strictly complementary, if either c = d
or h = j. (d) Ds (Us) human capital will be essential, if g = j (b = d).
As a benchmark case, I start by deriving the rst-best solution. In such
a solution, the e¢ cient trade possibility is always exploited. The net surplus
to be maximized is therefore
R(i)  C(e)  0:5
nX
k=1
(ik)
2   0:5
mX
j=1
(ej)
2 (1)
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As rst-order conditions, we obtain9
@R(i)
@ik
  ik = 0 , k = 1; :::; n (2)@C(e)@ej
  ej = 0 , j = 1; :::;m (3)
As can be seen from (2) and (3), in a rst-best solution, investment in each
component is set equal to its marginal e¤ect on revenue or costs, respectively.
Let us now turn to the model, which is solved by backward induction. I
thus begin with stage three. As indicated before, there are always ex post
gains from trade. These gains, in the amount of R(i)   C(e)   (r(i; A)  
c(e; B)), are not achieved under the initial contract since, when the contract
was signed, the parties did not know what type of input D requires. How-
ever, as mentioned before, the two parties realize the ex post gains through
negotiation, where the gains are equally shared. That is, the input price p
is determined such that the rent R(i)  C(e)  (r(i; A)  c(e; B)) is equally
divided. Summarizing, the ex-post payo¤s of D and U are given by
D = R(i)  p = r(i; A)  p+ 0:5(R(i)  C(e)  (r(i; A)  c(e;B)))(4)
U = p  C(e) = p  c(e;B) + 0:5(R(i)  C(e)  (r(i; A)  c(e;B)))(5)
At stage two of the model, D and U choose their investments. Their maxi-
9Note that the Hessian matrix corresponding to the maximization problem has the
entry  1 along the main diagonal and 0 elsewhere. Determining the leading principal
minors of this matrix, it can easily be shown that the function in (1) is strictly concave.
It follows that the expressions in (2) and (3) indeed maximize the function.
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mization problems are given by (6) and (7), respectively
Max
i0
D   0:5
nX
k=1
(ik)
2 (6)
Max
e0
U   0:5
mX
j=1
(ej)
2 (7)
The corresponding rst-order conditions are10
0:5
@R(i)
@ik
+ 0:5
@r(i; A)
@ik
  ik = 0 , k = 1; :::; n (8)
0:5
@C(e)@ej
+ 0:5 @c(e;B)@ej
  ej = 0 , j = 1; :::;m (9)
These rst-order conditions look familiar from Hart (1995). The only dif-
ference is that there is now a rst-order condition for each component of
investment. Hence, the results presented in Hart (1995) should hold even
with multidimensional investments. This is shown in Proposition 1:11
Proposition 1 With multidimensional investments, the results presented in
Hart (1995) remain valid. In particular, (a) if Ds (Us) investment be-
comes relatively unproductive and  ! 0, forward-integration (backward-
integration) will be optimal, (b) if the assets are independent, non-integration
will be optimal, (c) if the assets are strictly complementary, one form of inte-
gration will be optimal, (d) if Ds (Us) human capital is essential, backward-
integration (forward-integration) will be optimal.
10With a similar argumentation as for the rst-best solution one can show that the
functions in (6) and (7) are strictly concave so that the expressions in (8) and (9) indeed
solve the maximization problems.
11Holmström (1999) provides an example, where Proposition 1 does not hold with mul-
tidimensional investment. The reason is that in his example overinvestment is possible,
whereas in the current model it is not.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.
Note that with multidimensional investments there are usually two ine¢ -
ciencies. First, the parties invest ine¢ ciently low (as in the one-dimensional
case).12 Second, whenever the coe¢ cient vectors of the realized and the dis-
agreement benet are not parallel, there is misallocation of investment, i.e.
the parties allocate the resources they are going to spend in an ine¢ cient
way. While judging the single ownership structures one has to consider both
ine¢ ciencies. In each of the cases (a) to (d) there is some change in ownership
structure that leads to an increase in investment of one party, while leaving
the other partys investment or the benet from this investment una¤ected.
This change clearly mitigates the rst ine¢ ciency, on the other hand, it may
intensify the second one. That is, we may have two countervailing e¤ects on
total benet. However, as Proposition 1 shows, the rst e¤ect is always the
dominating one, so the single ownership structures can be judged unambigu-
ously. The reason is that investment in all components is ine¢ ciently low,
and the change brings each component closer to the rst-best level.
3 Signaling of investments
3.1 The signals
It is now assumed that there exists some signal of each partys investment.
Let the two signals be of the form s(i) = kT i and t(e) = mT e, with k 2 <n
12Bearing the restrictions a > b  c  d and f > g  h  j in mind, this follows directly
from a comparison of (2) with (8) and (3) with (9).
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and m 2 <m. Note that it is without loss of generality that the benet
and the signal coe¢ cient vectors consist of the same number of components.
If the signal was responsive to only some components of investment, the
other signal components would equal zero. Similarly, if some investment
components a¤ect the signal but not the benet, the respective benet co-
e¢ cient vector components would be zero.13 The signals are assumed to
be contractible, hence they can be part of an enforceable contract and used
to induce investment incentives. In Appendix 2, I demonstrate that linear
contracts can replicate every outcome to be achieved with the most general
contract. It is thus not restrictive at all to focus on linear incentive schemes
contingent on the signals, where D (U) receives from U (D) ISD = 0+s(i)
(ISU = 0 + t(e)), with 0; ; 0;  2 <.14 Denote  and  as piece-
rates. These piece-rates measure the strength of contractual incentives. The
incentive schemes are determined after ownership rights are allocated, but
before investments are chosen. The signal realizations are learned after in-
vestments are made, but before negotiations occur. Since both parties are
risk-neutral and wealth unconstrained, it is reasonable to assume that the
incentive schemes are determined such that the aggregate ex ante revenue of
the two parties is maximized. Determining the lump-sum payments 0 and
13The conditions a > b and f > g then must be replaced by ak > bk, for ak 6= 0, and
fj > gj , for fj 6= 0.
14This double contracting seems a little unusual, as, in most economic transactions, only
one party proposes an incentive contract for another one. However, note that the model
also includes this case, when all components of the signal coe¢ cient vector of one party
equal zero.
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0, D and U could allocate the revenue in a way that makes both better o¤.
3.2 Optimal investments and optimal incentive provi-
sion
As the introduction of pay tied to the signal realizations is the only di¤erence
from the model in Section 2, the two partiesex ante payo¤s change to (10)
and (11) and the rst-order conditions to (12) and (13), respectively15
r(i; A)  p+ 0:5(R(i)  C(e)  (r(i; A)  c(e; B))) (10)
+0 + s(i)  0   t(e)  0:5
nX
k=1
(ik)
2
p  c(e; B) + 0:5(R(i)  C(e)  (r(i; A)  c(e;B))) (11)
+0 + t(e)  0   s(i)  0:5
mX
j=1
(ej)
2
0 = 0:5
@R(i)
@ik
+ 0:5
@r(i; A)
@ik
+ 
@s(i)
@ik
  ik , k = 1; :::; n (12)
0 = 0:5
@C(e)@ej
+ 0:5 @c(e;B)@ej
+ @t (e)@ej   ej , j = 1; :::;m (13)
Obviously, investments now depend on two kinds of incentives, incentives
that are given by asset ownership and contractual incentives. In order to see
how the second kind of incentives changes the results from Section 2, one
needs to determine the optimal incentive schemes. While doing this, the two
15Notice that the Hessian matrices corresponding to the maximization problems are the
same as in the Section 2. The solutions in (12) and (13) therefore maximize the functions
in (10) and (11), respectively.
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parties face the following maximization problem:16
Max
i;e;;
R(i)  0:5
nX
k=1
(ik)
2   C(e)  0:5
mX
j=1
(ej)
2 (14)
s:t: 0 = 0:5
@R(i)
@ik
+ 0:5
@r(i; A)
@ik
+ 
@s(i)
@ik
  ik , k = 1; :::; n;
0 = 0:5
@C(e)@ej
+ 0:5 @c(e; B)@ej
+ @t (e)@ej   ej , j = 1; :::;m
Solving this problem, yields the subsequent proposition:
Proposition 2 The optimal piece-rates are given by y =
p
aT a cos  
p
yT y cosy
2
p
kT k
(if k 6= 0, and y 2 < otherwise) and z =
p
fT f cos  
p
zT z cos z
2
p
mTm
(if m 6= 0,
and z 2 < otherwise), where  is the angle between a and k, y = b; c; d, y
is the angle between y and k,  is the angle between f and m, z = j; h; g, and
z is the angle between z and m.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 gives insight in the optimal incentive schemes of the two
parties. First, note that the cosine of the angle between the benet and
the signal coe¢ cient vector measures the distortion between these vectors.
A higher value of the cosine corresponds to a signal that is less distorted
from the benet.17 Unlike in previous work on multitasking, the strength
16Since they are only used to allocate revenue, we do not further consider the xed
payments. Their determination depends on the ex ante bargaining power of the two
parties that we do not specify in this paper. Note, however, that, due to the fundamental
transformation described by e.g. Williamson (1985), the ex ante bargaining power of a
party may be di¤erent from its ex post bargaining power.
17See e.g. Baker (2002), Feltham & Xie (1994), or Schnedler (2003). Baker and Feltham
& Xie develop di¤erent measures of e¤ort misallocation (e¤ort in these models corresponds
16
of incentives depends on two distortions, the distortion of the available sig-
nal from realized benet and its distortion from disagreement benet. The
intuition behind this result is as follows: As shown in Section 2, ex ante in-
vestments are, in the absence of contractual incentive provision, ine¢ ciently
low and usually misallocated to the single components. While installing an
incentive scheme, the parties try to mitigate both ine¢ ciencies. Consider e.g.
Ds investment choice. Without contractual incentive provision, he chooses
i = 0:5a+0:5y, while rst-best investment satises ifb = a. Hence, optimally,
contractual incentives would increase investment by ifb  i = 0:5a  0:5y. In
order to achieve this, a signal with a coe¢ cient vector parallel to 0:5a  0:5y
is needed. Stated di¤erently, a desirable signal is of the form s = kT i, with
k = const (0:5a  0:5y), and const 6= 0. Bearing this in mind, Proposition 2
is very intuitive. It simply states that the weight a signal is given in the wage
contract should decrease, the more the signal deviates from the optimal signal
s = kT i. Further, note that the piece-rate naturally depends on the lengths
of the single coe¢ cient vectors. If the signal coe¢ cient vector is rather small
compared to the benet coe¢ cient vectors, the signal is obviously given a
higher weight (and vice versa).
The structure of the model allows us to give some nice geometric inter-
pretation of the optimal piece-rate that proves useful, when turning to the
to investments in the current one). Schnedler proposes several properties such a misal-
location measure should possess. While Feltham & Xies measure fails to possess these
properties, a slight variation of Bakers measure exhibits all these properties. Bakers
measure is the same as used in this paper, namely the cosine of the angle between the
benet and the signal coe¢ cient vector.
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optimal ownership structure. From (12), we see that Ds investment lies on
the straight line i = 0:5rR(i) + 0:5rr(i; A) + rs(i), with r denoting the
gradient of the respective functions. By determining , the parties select
a particular point on the line. It can be shown that this is the point on
the line, whose Euclidean distance to ifb is minimal. In fact, minimizing
jrR(i)  (0:5rR(i) + 0:5rr(i; A) + rs(i))j over  leads to the same solu-
tion for the piece-rate as in Proposition 2. This result, however, depends on
the specic forms of the benet and cost functions. If e.g. marginal invest-
ment costs were not linear, the equivalence of the two optimization problems
would disappear.
Let us now turn to the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Suppose that there exist two di¤erent signals of a partys in-
vestment, but that the parties are only allowed to contract on one of them.
They may then decide to contract on the more distorted signal (with respect
to the realized benet).
We prove this corollary by giving an example. Suppose that Us invest-
ment is relatively unproductive and that  ! 0. That is, ownership rights
should be allocated such that R(i)  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is maximized. Further,
assume that a = (1; 1), b = (b1; 0), with b1 2 (0; 1), c = d  0. Let
k1 = (0; 1) and k2 =
 
1
2
; 1

denote the coe¢ cient vectors of the two avail-
able signals. After some calculations one can show that, in this example,
it is optimal to give all ownership rights to D, that is, backward integra-
tion is optimal. Using the rst signal, the parties would choose b;1 = 0:5
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and the surplus was 7+2b1 (b1)
2
8
. Using the second signal, the correspond-
ing piece-rate was b;2 = 3 b15 leading to surplus
39+4b1 4(b1)2
40
. The parties
will then contract on the rst signal, if and only if b1  b1  0:764. Note
that the second signal is the less distorted one with respect to R(i) since
cos 1 = 2
 0:5 < cos 2 =
3
50:5
2 0:5. In other words, for some parameter val-
ues the parties contract on the less distorted signal, while for others they
contract on the more distorted one.
This result directly follows from Proposition 2. As an optimal signal has
a coe¢ cient vector that is parallel to 0:5a 0:5y, the parties do not only care
for the signal distortion with respect to the realized benet, but also for its
distortion with respect to the disagreement benet. Hence, without taking
this second distortion into account, one cannot assess a signals appropriate-
ness.
Note that Corollary 3 also implies that the parties might not increase the
quality of a certain signal with respect to the realized benet, even if this
were totally costless. This complements the ndings in Schnedler (2005), who
states, in a model neglecting property-rights considerations, that a signal
being ceteris paribus less distorted with respect to benet is always superior
to the more distorted signal. To summarize, a signal that at rst sight seems
to be very appropriate (because of a low distortion from the realized benet)
might be less appropriate, if its distortion from the disagreement benet is
taken into account, too.
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3.3 The optimal ownership structure
Before turning to the optimal ownership structure, denote by EDD(A) the
Euclidean distance of Ds investment i = 0:5a+0:5y+yk from the rst-best
investment ifb = a. Similarly, let EDU(B) denote the Euclidean distance of
Us investment e = 0:5f+0:5z+zm from rst-best investment efb = f . One
can easily show thatEDD(A) =

0:25aTa  0:5aTy + 0:25yTy   0:25((a y)
T k)
2
kT k
0:5
and EDU(B) =

0:25fTf   0:5fT z + 0:25zT z   0:25((f z)
Tm)
2
mTm
0:5
.
Suppose rst that only one partys investment matters. Proposition 4
describes, in this case, the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 4 Given that only Ds (Us) investment matters, the two par-
ties select the ownership structure minimizing EDD(A) (EDU(B)).
Proof. See Appendix 1.
When judging the single ownership structures, the parties take into ac-
count both, the residual rights incentives and the contractual ones that each
ownership structure entails. In particular, they choose to allocate the assets
such that the induced investment lies closest to its rst-best level. Assets are
therefore allocated such that the single coe¢ cient vectors best "t" together.
For example, if the signal shows little distortion from realized benet, an
ownership structure with a disagreement benet vector, which is either short
or shows little distortion from realized benet, will be optimal.
Suppose now that the parties care for both investments. Proposition 5
describes the optimal ownership structure in this case:
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Proposition 5 If the parties care for both investments, they will select the
ownership structure minimizing (EDD(A))
2 + (EDU(B))
2.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Note rst that it will be a very easy task to determine the optimal own-
ership structure, if the ownership structure being optimal when only Ds
or Us investment is important, respectively, is the same. Technically, this
means that there exists an allocation of assets that minimizes EDD(A)
and EDU(B). Clearly, this allocation of assets minimizes (EDD(A))
2 +
(EDU(B))
2, too. Of more interest is the case, where the ownership struc-
ture minimizing EDD(A) di¤ers from the ownership structure minimizing
EDU(B). Here, Proposition 5 implies that not the levels of the investments
per se, but their deviations from the respective rst-best investments are
important. In particular, an ownership structure will be optimal, if it leads
to investments, which both deviate relatively little from the respective rst-
best investments. Further, an extreme deviation of one investment should
be avoided, even if the other investments deviation is very low.18 As a con-
sequence, the relative importance of the two investments matters. Assume
e.g. that Ds investment is much more e¤ective in increasing revenue than
Us investment is in decreasing production costs. Then, the components in a
18This follows from the squaring of the Euclidean distances in Proposition 5. If the
Euclidean distances were not squared, it would not matter, how the aggregate Euclidean
distance is divided between the two investments. For example, an ownership structure
yielding EDD(A) = 1 and EDU (B) = 5 were as good as another yielding EDD(A) +
EDU (B) = 3. Applying the decision rule from Proposition 5, on the other hand, the
second ownership structure dominates the rst.
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should be higher than the components in f , implying that the single compo-
nents of ifb are higher than the single components of efb. By allocating assets
such that both investments di¤er relatively little from their rst-best levels,
it is thus important to induce D to invest higher into the single components
than U.
Finally, we analyze whether or not the results of Proposition 1 are robust
to an introduction of investment signals. As the following proposition shows,
the answer is negative, i.e. the presence of investment signals changes the
results.
Proposition 6 With investment signals, either non-integration or some kind
of integration will be optimal, even if (a) some partys investment is relatively
unproductive and  ! 0, (b) the assets are independent, (c) the assets are
strictly complementary, or (d) some partys human capital is essential.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
In the presence of investment signals, the assumptions under (a) to (d)
are not su¢ cient to rank the ownership structures unambiguously. The rea-
son is that the e¤ectiveness of contractual incentives may increase as residual
rights incentives decrease. In other words, providing a party with ownership
rights might worsen that partys investment choice. In this case, the results
in Proposition 1 do no longer hold. To give an illustration, consider part
(a) of Proposition 6. Assume that Us investment is relatively unproduc-
tive and that  ! 0. The parties then allocate ownership rights such that
R(i)  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is maximized. Assume further, that k is parallel to a.
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As described before, an optimal ownership structure is one, where Ds dis-
agreement benet coe¢ cient vector is either short or shows little distortion
from the realized benet coe¢ cient vector. Hence, backward-integration need
not be optimal. Giving more assets to D might lead to a highly distorted,
and also long disagreement benet coe¢ cient vector. Such a vector might
prevent an e¢ cient signal use so that backward-integration is dominated.
To summarize, the results in Proposition 1 should further hold, if allo-
cating ownership rights does not extremely a¤ect the signal use in incentive
contracts. Otherwise, the results are likely to break down.
3.4 Reversed non-integration and joint ownership
In the property rights literature, reversed non-integration has not received
much attention. Without investment signals, it is easily found that it is
dominated by non-integration. Since D works primarily with as1 and U with
as2, it is very likely that D is more productive with as1 than as2. Simi-
larly, U is expected to be more productive with as2 than as1. Technically,
this means that @r(i;as1)
@ik
> @r(i;as2)
@ik
, 8i, 8k, and
@c(e;as2)@ej  > @c(e;as1)@ej , 8e,
8j. Clearly, given these inequalities non-integration leads to higher invest-
ments than reversed non-integration. However, in the presence of investment
signals, ownership structures are evaluated according to two criteria, the
residual rights and the contractual incentives they entail. Therefore, even
reversed non-integration may be an optimal ownership structure. If it allows
the parties to better use the signals in incentive contracts compared to the
other ownership structures, its weaknesses in providing high residual rights
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incentives might be outbalanced.
Similarly, di¤erent from the GHM results joint ownership of an asset19
might be optimal, too. Under joint ownership, either side is able to veto the
use of an asset. As a consequence, in the event of disagreement, the assets
under joint ownership become unavailable for both parties. This entails lower
residual rights incentives. On the other hand, the signals might be used more
intensely in incentive contracts, so joint ownership might be preferred.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper extended the property-rights approach to the theory of the rm
by introducing distorted signals of the partiesmultidimensional investments.
It was shown that this extension crucially a¤ects the original results. The
main ndings are the following:
 The extension to multidimensional investments will usually lead to
a second ine¢ ciency, if investment signals are not available. Investments are
then not only ine¢ ciently low, but also misallocated to the di¤erent compo-
nents. Yet, giving a party comprehensive ownership rights yields second-best
investments of this party. Even if these ownership rights lead to a more dis-
torted investment, the advantage of higher investment incentives that own-
ership rights entail will dominate. Therefore, the results presented in Hart
(1995) are robust to a generalization to multidimensional investments.
 The strength of contractual incentives depends on both, the signal
19For alternative explanations of joint ownership of assets see e.g Cai (2003), Rosenkranz
& Schmitz (2003) or Schmitz (forthcoming).
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distortion from the realized benet as well as from the disagreement benet.
 As a direct consequence, a party might prefer tying the other partys
remuneration to a signal of little quality (with respect to the realized benet),
even if the signal quality could be increased at zero costs.
 The optimal ownership structure depends on both, the residual
rights incentives and the contractual incentives it entails. For this reason,
the results presented in Hart (1995) are not robust to an introduction of in-
vestment signals. Di¤erent from Hart (1995), removing assets from a party
might improve that partys investment decision. Thinking of the important
role of investment signals in contract theory and their availability in many
real-world settings, this result is of particular interest.
It is this wide availability of investment signals that makes the introduc-
tion of such signals into the property-rights theory of the rm so important.
This paper provides a guide of how using investment signals in an incentive
contract and of how optimal ownership structure should respond to the ex-
istence of investment signals. Of particular importance are the distortions
of the single coe¢ cient vectors. In order to make the theory applicable for
predicting or explaining ownership structures being prevalent in practice, one
has to think about how disagreement benet vectors and, hence, the single
distortions vary with ownership structure. Of course, a comprehensive an-
swer to this question cannot be given. Yet, many real-world relationships
should have the following property in common: Some components of invest-
ment should be fully worthless without having access to some asset or the
other partys human capital. For example, suppose that Us investment may
25
be divided into two groups, investment that generally decreases the produc-
tion costs of a class of inputs and investment that is solely oriented at Ds
needs, i.e. investment that decreases the costs of producing the special input
D requires. If both parties do not agree to trade and if U does not have access
to as1, this second type of investment will be totally worthless. What does
this observation mean in terms of the model? It implies that the distortion
in a partys investment behavior due to residual rights incentives probably
increases as the party has access to fewer assets. This has consequences for
the use of signals in incentive contracts and for asset allocation. For example,
it is less likely that a party with a totally undistorted signal should be given
no ownership rights. The e¤ectiveness of the signal in inducing investment
incentives would in this case su¤er from the distorted residual rights incen-
tives. However, if the idea concerning the relative distortion of disagreement
benets is really true, has to be shown empirically. I leave this for future
research.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a)
Consider the case, where Us investment is relatively unproductive and
! 0. Replacing
@C(e)@ej  by  @C(e)@ej + (1  )ej and @c(e;B)@ej  by  @c(e;B)@ej +
(1  )ej, it can be seen that Us rst-order conditions remain the same and
are independent of . The aggregate benet, on the other hand, changes
to R(i)  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2   C(e)  0:5Pmj=1(ej)2, which tends to R(i) 
0:5
Pn
k=1 (i

k)
2, as  ! 0. Thus, the parties allocate ownership rights such
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that R(i)  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is maximized. The case, where Ds investment is
relatively unproductive is analogous. R(i)   0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 can be rewrit-
ten as a1i1 + ::: + ani

n   0:5 (i1)2   :::   0:5 (in)2 or
Pn
k=1
 
aki

k   0:5 (ik)2

.
Hence, if there is an ownership structure that yields higher investment in
each component of i than the other ownership structures (notice that invest-
ment is always ine¢ ciently low), this ownership structure will be optimal.
Since b  c  d, backward integration is optimal.
(b)
Note that, with independent assets, giving D or U a second asset does
not change their investment. As a consequence, giving D a second asset
leaves i unchanged, but leads to an investment e that is dominated by the
investment in case of non-integration since every investment component is
at most as high as under non-integration. Hence, backward-integration is
(weakly) dominated by non-integration. With a similar argument, forward-
integration is (weakly) dominated by non-integration. Non-integration is
therefore optimal.
(c)
Note that, with strictly complementary assets, giving D or U a rst asset
does not change their investment. Hence, changing from non-integration to
backward integration does not change Us investment, but (weakly) increases
each component of Ds investment. Such a change is therefore welfare en-
hancing, and non-integration is (weakly) dominated.
(d)
If Ds human capital is essential, from g = j and g  h  j, it follows
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that g = h = j. Then, U chooses the same investment no matter what the
allocation of assets looks like. Hence, ownership rights should be allocated
such that R(i)   0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is maximized. From part (a), we know
that backward-integration is optimal in this case. Analogously, if Us human
capital is essential, forward-integration will be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Note rst that for k  0 (analogously form  0) no contractual incentives
can be provided for D (U), so that every piece-rate performs equally well.
This is no longer the case when k 6= 0 or m 6= 0 (or both). In this
case, I explicitly derive the optimal piece-rates under backward-integration.
The solutions under other ownership structures can be derived analogously.
Inserting the optimal investments, maximization problem (14) can be written
as
Max
;
0:5aTa+ 0:5aT b+ aTk   0:5
nX
k=1
(0:5ak + 0:5bk + kk)
2
+0:5fTf + 0:5fT j + fTm  0:5
mX
j=1
(0:5fj + 0:5jj + mj)
2
The rst-order conditions to this maximization problem are20
@
@
= aTk  
nX
k=1
(0:5ak + 0:5bk + kk) kk = 0
@
@
= fTm 
mX
j=1
(0:5fj + 0:5jj + mj)mj = 0
20The corresponding Hessian matrix is H =
0B@  kT k 0
0  mTm
1CA. The func-
tion in maximization problem (14) is strictly concave, as ( 1)   kT k > 0 and
( 1)2   kT k   mTm > 0. The solution to be obtained is therefore indeed a maximum.
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Simplifying these conditions yields
0:5aTk = 0:5bTk + kTk ()  = 0:5a
Tk   0:5bTk
kTk
()  = 0:5p
kTk
p
aTa
aTkp
aTa
p
kTk
 
p
bT b
bTkp
bT b
p
kTk

and
0:5fTm = 0:5jTm+ mTm()  = 0:5f
Tm  0:5jTm
mTm
()  = 0:5p
mTm
 p
fTf
fTmp
fTf
p
mTm
 
p
jT j
jTmp
jT j
p
mTm
!
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Suppose that only Ds investment is of interest and compare the case of
non-integration to the case of backward-integration. Other comparisons as
well as the case, where only Us investment matters, are completely analo-
gous. Total benet in case of non-integration is given by
0:5aTa+0:5aT c+aTk
0:5aTk   0:5cTk
kTk
 0:5
nX
k=1

0:5ak + 0:5ck + kk
0:5aTk   0:5cTk
kTk
2
whereas total benet in case of backward-integration is
0:5aTa+0:5aT b+aTk
0:5aTk   0:5bTk
kTk
 0:5
nX
k=1

0:5ak + 0:5bk + kk
0:5aTk   0:5bTk
kTk
2
As assumed the parties settle on the ownership structure that yields high-
est total benet. Hence, non-integration will be preferred to backward-
integration, if and only if the former benet exceeds the latter. This can
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be rewritten as
 (a
Tk)(cTk)
4kTk
  c
T c
8
 
 
aTk   cTk2
8kTk
+
aT c
4
  cTka
Tk   cTk
4kTk
>  (a
Tk)(bTk)
4kTk
  b
T b
8
 
 
aTk   bTk2
8kTk
+
aT b
4
  bTka
Tk   bTk
4kTk
() bT b  cT c  2aT (b  c)  1
kTk

2(aTk)
 
(cTk)  (bTk)   cTk2 +  bTk2 > 0
The last condition is equivalent to
0:25aTa+ 0:25bT b  0:5aT b  0:25
kTk

(a  b)T k
2
> 0:25aTa+ 0:25cT c  0:5aT c  0:25
kTk

(a  c)T k
2
or using the expressions for the Euclidean distances to
EDD(as1; as2) > EDD(as1)
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof of Proposition 5 is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. Again,
we compare the case of non-integration with the case of backward-integration.
Other comparisons are completely analogous. Total benet in case of non-
integration is
0:5aTa+ 0:5aT c+ aTk
0:5aTk   0:5cTk
kTk
 0:5
nX
k=1

0:5ak + 0:5ck + kk
0:5aTk   0:5cTk
kTk
2
+0:5fTf + 0:5fTh+ fTm
0:5fTm  0:5hTm
mTm
 0:5
mX
j=1

0:5fj + 0:5hj +mj
0:5fTm  0:5hTm
mTm
2
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while total benet under backward-integration is
0:5aTa+ 0:5aT b+ aTk
0:5aTk   0:5bTk
kTk
 0:5
nX
k=1

0:5ak + 0:5bk + kk
0:5aTk   0:5bTk
kTk
2
+0:5fTf + 0:5fT j + fTm
0:5fTm  0:5jTm
mTm
 0:5
mX
j=1

0:5fj + 0:5jj +mj
0:5fTm  0:5jTm
mTm
2
In analogy to the proof of Proposition 4 one can show that the former benet
will exceed the latter, if the following condition holds:
0:25aTa+ 0:25bT b  0:5aT b  0:25
kTk

(a  b)T k
2
+0:25fTf + 0:25jT j   0:5fT j   0:25
mTm

(f   j)T m
2
> 0:25aTa+ 0:25cT c  0:5aT c  0:25
kTk

(a  c)T k
2
+0:25fTf + 0:25hTh  0:5fTh  0:25
mTm

(f   h)T m
2
Using the expressions for the Euclidean distances, this is equivalent to
(EDD(as1; as2))
2 + (EDU(Ø))
2 > (EDD(as1))
2 + (EDU(as2))
2
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6:
I prove this proposition by giving examples, where each of the three con-
sidered ownership structures is optimal, respectively.
(a)
Suppose that Us investment is relatively unproductive and that  ! 0
so that ownership structure is chosen such that R(i)   0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is
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maximized. Further, assume that a = (1; 1), b =
 
4
5
; 4
5

, c =
 
4
5
; 1
2

and
d =
 
0; 1
2

. Backward-integration will be optimal, if k  0, non-integration,
if k =
 
1
5
; 1
2

and forward-integration, if k =
 
1; 1
2

. The case where Ds
investment is relatively unproductive is analogous.
(b)
Suppose that a = (1; 1), b = c =
 
4
5
; 4
5

and d =
 
0; 1
2

. Moreover,
think that f = (1; 1), g = h =
 
1
2
; 1
2

, j  0 and m = (1; 1). Then, both,
backward-integration and non-integration will be optimal, if k =
 
1
2
; 1
2

, while
forward-integration will be optimal, if k =
 
1; 1
2

.
(c)
Suppose that a = (1; 1), b =
 
4
5
; 4
5

and c = d =
 
0; 1
2

. Moreover, assume
that f = (1; 1), g =
 
1
2
; 1
2

, h = j  0 and m = (1; 1). Then, backward-
integration will be optimal, if k =
 
1
2
; 1
2

, whereas both, non-integration and
forward-integration will be optimal, if k =
 
1; 1
2

.
(d)
Suppose that Ds human capital is essential. As shown before, owner-
ship rights are then allocated such that R(i)  0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 is maximized.
The examples in part (a) of this proposition show that, in this case, each
ownership structure may be optimal.
Appendix 2
In this Appendix, it is shown that linear contracts are able to replicate the
outcome to be achieved with the most general contract. The proof is similar
to a proof in Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine (1995), who also show that linear
contracts are optimal in their model. For ease of exposition, we restrict atten-
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tion to the case, where only U o¤ers D a contract (an extension to the double
contracting analyzed in Section 3 is straightforward). Let the contract be of
the form w (s (i) ; t (e)), with w being di¤erentiable in both arguments. Ds
investment is then given by i = 0:5rR(i)+0:5rr(i; A)+ @w(s(i);t(e))
@s(i)
rs(i), as t
is independent of i. The contract is set such that aggregate ex ante revenue is
maximized. Under the optimal contract, D is induced to choose some invest-
ment i, which is given by i = 0:5rR(i)+0:5rr(i; A)+ @w(s(i);t(e))
@s(i)
rs(i).
Consider now the linear contract w = 0+1s (i) used in Section 3. By set-
ting 1 =
@w(s(i);t(e))
@s(i)
, this contract leads to same investment and can thus
replicate the outcome of the general contract. Similarly, the outcome to be
achieved by a contract v(s(i); t(e)) that is not everywhere di¤erentiable can
be replicated by a linear contract, too. I show this for a very simple contract.
It is very easy to apply the argument to more complex contracts. Suppose
that the contract species some payment v^ > 0 to be transferred from U to
D, if s(i) (weakly) exceeds some threshold value s^. Note that this contract
will only make sense, if s(0:5rR(i)+0:5rr(i; A)) < s^. Further, assume that
v^ is so high that it is in Ds interest to invest such that s(i)  s^. The La-
grangian to Ds maximization problem is then L = r(i; A)   p + 0:5(R(i)  
C(e)   (r(i; A)   c(e;B))) + v^   0:5Pnk=1 (ik)2 +  (s(i)  s^), where  is a
Lagrange multiplier. Notice that s(0:5rR(i) + 0:5rr(i; A)) < s^ implies that
the constraint s(i)  s^ is never slack. Hence,  > 0. Optimal investment is
therefore given by i = 0:5rR(i) + 0:5rr(i; A) + rs(i). Under the optimal
contract, we get a certain value for the parameter , say . It is easy to see
that a linear contract with  =  is again able to replicate the outcome of
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the non-di¤erentiable contract. Q.E.D.
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